Today’s advances in fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) promise a transformational technology that is critical to enabling the next industrial revolution. 5G will provide massive benefits for future economic development and national competitiveness, including certain military applications. 5G is far more than simply a faster iteration of 4G. The benefits include its high speed, low latency, and high throughput, which enable data flows at vastly greater speed and volume than today’s 4G networks. Future smart cities will rely on 5G, autonomous vehicles will depend on this increased connectivity, future manufacturing will leverage 5G to enable improved automation, and even agriculture could benefit from these advances. The advent of 5G could contribute trillions to the world economy over the next couple of decades, setting the stage for new advances in productivity and innovation.
The United States risks losing a critical competitive advantage if it fails to capitalize upon the opportunity and manage the challenges of 5G. Today, China seems poised to become a global leader and first mover in 5G. The United States may be situated in a position of relative disadvantage. The U.S. government has yet to commit to any funding or national initiatives in 5G that are close to comparable in scope and scale to those of China, which is dedicating hundreds of billions to 5G development and deployment. There are also reasons for serious concern about the long-term viability and diversity of global supply chains in this industry. Huawei, a Chinese company with global ambitions, seems to be on course to become dominant in 5G, establishing new pilots and partnerships worldwide. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
For many years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) have had a broad and productive relationship exploring critical issues in the U.S.-China relationship and in global affairs. Since 2015, we have cohosted the U.S.-China Dialogue on the Global Economic Order, a track 1.5 dialogue that has sought to build mutual trust, enhance communication, identify issues, and propose solutions. The series of semiannual workshops, alternating between China and the United States, has covered a wide range of topics, including trade, investment, finance, and technology. The dialogue has drawn scholars, former policymakers, and current officials from the United States and China across a wide range of institutions and disciplines.
This volume consists of a series of parallel essays on the global economic order by U.S. and Chinese scholars who have participated in our dialogue. The value of this text is found not only in the ideas presented by the essayists but also in the opportunity to “listen” to each other as we manage our differences and seek a shared reform agenda for the global economic order. This report starts the journey.
These essays were drafted during the Spring of 2019 and reflect data that may have changed since that period. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
In 2012, China and 11 EU countries from Central and Southern
Europe and 5 non-EU members from the Western Balkans met in Warsaw, Poland for
the first time in a “16+1” format to deepen economic cooperation in the areas
of infrastructure as well as information and green technological development.
The occasion was marked by the signing of “China’s Twelve Measures for
Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries” and
the official launch of the 16+1. Seven years later in Dubrovnik, Croatia, the
format has now grown to “17+1” with the inclusion of Greece. Nearly 40
bilateral deals were announced between China and partner countries, which
included the opening of credit lines between the China Development Bank and
Hungary worth €500 million, Croatia worth €300 million, Romania worth €100
million, Bulgaria worth €300 million, and Serbia worth €25 million.
It could be suggested that this region was in fact an early
test case for the Chinese government’s 2013 announcement of its global Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), which envisions land and maritime transportation
corridors stretching across and around the Eurasian landmass to Europe.
Certainly, there was a strong infrastructure demand signal emanating from the
region, which grew frustrated when its needs for new roads, modern ports, and
high-speed rail went unmet by Western investment. Having developed the unique,
mixed EU and non-EU 16+1 structure, Beijing could claim to be helping to
“bridge” the EU and non-EU divide. It also gained a high-profile vehicle to
channel a portion of the BRI’s $1 trillion in promised infrastructure
investment. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
The role of information warfare in global strategic
competition has become much more apparent in recent years. Today’s
practitioners of what this report’s authors term hostile social manipulation
employ targeted social media campaigns, sophisticated forgeries, cyberbullying
and harassment of individuals, distribution of rumors and conspiracy theories,
and other tools and approaches to cause damage to the target state. These
emerging tools and techniques represent a potentially significant threat to
U.S. and allied national interests. This report represents an effort to better
define and understand the challenge by focusing on the activities of the two
leading authors of such techniques — Russia and China. The authors conduct a
detailed assessment of available evidence of Russian and Chinese social
manipulation efforts, the doctrines and strategies behind such efforts, and
evidence of their potential effectiveness. RAND analysts reviewed English-,
Russian-, and Chinese-language sources; examined national security strategies
and policies and military doctrines; surveyed existing public-source evidence
of Russian and Chinese activities; and assessed multiple categories of evidence
of effectiveness of Russian activities in Europe, including public opinion
data, evidence on the trends in support of political parties and movements
sympathetic to Russia, and data from national defense policies. The authors
find a growing commitment to tools of social manipulation by leading U.S.
competitors. The findings in this report are sufficient to suggest that the
U.S. government should take several immediate steps, including developing a
more formal and concrete framework for understanding the issue and funding
additional research to understand the scope of the challenge. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
China’s Belt and Road Initiative winds its way into Europe including cooperation and projects with 16 Central and Eastern Europe nations. The sixth annual meeting of 16+1 heads of state convened in Hungary to plan investments in technology, finance, agriculture, health, education and more, Michal Romanowski, with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, categorizes four types of Chinese involvement in the region: As connector, China invests in infrastructure, presenting a warning for Brussels not to neglect Central and Eastern Europe. As shaper, China often overlooks diversity and treats the region as a single bloc, which in turn can prompt caution. As investor, China has not made Central and Eastern Europe a priority, and the United States and the European Union are responsible for the bulk of the region’s foreign investment. Still, China with ample resources can be regarded as challenger for enterprises inside the region and beyond. “It should be remembered in Central and Eastern Europe that China has grown into a promoter of globalization not only out of goodwill but due to its own national interests,” Romanowski notes. He urges leaders throughout the region and Europe as a whole to adopt a similar pragmatic attitude. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
An immediate challenge for the international community, one that dominated discussions at the G20 summit in Hamberg, is North Korea. The dogged pursuit of a nuclear weapons by the rogue nation illustrates the repercussions and security dilemma of any nation’s quest for absolute security, heightening anxiety among neighboring states along with hostile rhetoric and buildup of catastrophic weapons. Richard Weitz, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, suggests that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed by China, Russia and other neighbors after the Cold War, may offer some lessons. “Although rarely openly discussed at Eurasian meetings, member states value the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a means of enhancing mutual reassurance among members to reduce regional security dilemmas,” he writes. “SCO documents and statements repeatedly renounce the logic of absolute security, and members overly commit to eschewing actions that could harm other members’ security.” A challenge for the SCO, of course, is balancing relations between Russia and China. Unequivocal pursuit of dominance in security and economic affairs, without concern for neighboring states, is a recipe for disaster. [Note: contains copyrighted material].
This paper addresses the challenges facing retirement systems, including the impact of ageing societies, and quantifies the size of the savings shortfall. It provides recommendations for system design and actions for policy-makers to ensure we can adjust to societies in which living to 100 is commonplace and affordable for all. The paper is accompanied by the Case Studies in Retirement System Reform which presents 12 examples of pension reform from governments, pension funds and companies around the world. [Note: contains copyrighted material].